TY - GEN
T1 - A diffie-hellman key exchange protocol without random oracles
AU - Jeong, Ik Rae
AU - Kwon, Jeong Ok
AU - Lee, Dong Hoon
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2006
Y1 - 2006
N2 - TheMQV protocol of Law, Menezes, Qu, Slinas and Vanstone has been regarded as the most efficient authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, and standardized by many organizations including the US NSA. In Crypto 2005, Hugo Krawczyk showed vulnerabilities of MQV to several attacks and suggested a hashed variant of MQV, called HMQV, which provides the same superb performance of MQV and provable security in the random oracle model. In this paper we suggest an efficient authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol providing the same functionalities and security of HMQV without random oracles. There exist some provably secure key exchange schemes using signatures in the standard model, but all of the schemes do not provide the same level of security of HMQV. So far there are no authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocols which are proven secure in the standard model and achieve the same level of security goals of HMQV efficiently yet. Dispensing of random oracles in our protocol does not require any expensive signature and encryption schemes.
AB - TheMQV protocol of Law, Menezes, Qu, Slinas and Vanstone has been regarded as the most efficient authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, and standardized by many organizations including the US NSA. In Crypto 2005, Hugo Krawczyk showed vulnerabilities of MQV to several attacks and suggested a hashed variant of MQV, called HMQV, which provides the same superb performance of MQV and provable security in the random oracle model. In this paper we suggest an efficient authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol providing the same functionalities and security of HMQV without random oracles. There exist some provably secure key exchange schemes using signatures in the standard model, but all of the schemes do not provide the same level of security of HMQV. So far there are no authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocols which are proven secure in the standard model and achieve the same level of security goals of HMQV efficiently yet. Dispensing of random oracles in our protocol does not require any expensive signature and encryption schemes.
KW - Diffie-hellman protocol
KW - Key compromise impersonation
KW - Key exchange
KW - Strong forward secrecy
KW - Unknown key share
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U2 - 10.1007/11935070_3
DO - 10.1007/11935070_3
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84885934262
SN - 9783540494621
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 37
EP - 54
BT - Cryptology and Network Security - 5th International Conference, CANS 2006, Proceedings
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 5th International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security, CANS 2006
Y2 - 8 December 2006 through 10 December 2006
ER -