A lottery Blotto game with heterogeneous items of asymmetric valuations

Geofferey Jiyun Kim; Jerim Kim; Bara Kim

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2018.09.001

A lottery Blotto game with heterogeneous items of asymmetric valuations

Geofferey Jiyun Kim, Jerim Kim, Bara Kim

Department of Mathematics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We develop a multi-player lottery Blotto game in which each contested item can be valuated differently by involved agents and in which each contested item can be differently valuated from other contested items. We prove that the Blotto game with a finite number of agents has a Nash equilibrium. We characterize all Nash equilibria for the case of two agents.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-5
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	173
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.09.001
Publication status	Published - 2018 Dec

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Jerim Kim’s research was supported by Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Science, ICT & Future Planning, South Korea ( 2016R1C1B1016602 ). Bara Kim’s research was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government (MSIP) ( NRF-2017R1A2B4012676 ).

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018

Copyright:
Copyright 2018 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

Keywords

Asymmetric valuations
Heterogeneous items
Lagrange multiplier
Lottery Blotto game
Nash equilibria

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2018.09.001

Cite this

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title = "A lottery Blotto game with heterogeneous items of asymmetric valuations",

abstract = "We develop a multi-player lottery Blotto game in which each contested item can be valuated differently by involved agents and in which each contested item can be differently valuated from other contested items. We prove that the Blotto game with a finite number of agents has a Nash equilibrium. We characterize all Nash equilibria for the case of two agents.",

keywords = "Asymmetric valuations, Heterogeneous items, Lagrange multiplier, Lottery Blotto game, Nash equilibria",

author = "Kim, {Geofferey Jiyun} and Jerim Kim and Bara Kim",

note = "Funding Information: Jerim Kim{\textquoteright}s research was supported by Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Science, ICT & Future Planning, South Korea ( 2016R1C1B1016602 ). Bara Kim{\textquoteright}s research was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government (MSIP) ( NRF-2017R1A2B4012676 ). Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2018 Copyright: Copyright 2018 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",

year = "2018",

month = dec,

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2018.09.001",

language = "English",

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journal = "Economics Letters",

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AU - Kim, Geofferey Jiyun

AU - Kim, Jerim

AU - Kim, Bara

N1 - Funding Information: Jerim Kim’s research was supported by Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Science, ICT & Future Planning, South Korea ( 2016R1C1B1016602 ). Bara Kim’s research was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government (MSIP) ( NRF-2017R1A2B4012676 ). Publisher Copyright: © 2018 Copyright: Copyright 2018 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2018/12

Y1 - 2018/12

N2 - We develop a multi-player lottery Blotto game in which each contested item can be valuated differently by involved agents and in which each contested item can be differently valuated from other contested items. We prove that the Blotto game with a finite number of agents has a Nash equilibrium. We characterize all Nash equilibria for the case of two agents.

AB - We develop a multi-player lottery Blotto game in which each contested item can be valuated differently by involved agents and in which each contested item can be differently valuated from other contested items. We prove that the Blotto game with a finite number of agents has a Nash equilibrium. We characterize all Nash equilibria for the case of two agents.

KW - Asymmetric valuations

KW - Heterogeneous items

KW - Lagrange multiplier

KW - Lottery Blotto game

KW - Nash equilibria

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SN - 0165-1765

VL - 173

SP - 1

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

ER -

A lottery Blotto game with heterogeneous items of asymmetric valuations

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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