We develop a multi-player lottery Blotto game in which each contested item can be valuated differently by involved agents and in which each contested item can be differently valuated from other contested items. We prove that the Blotto game with a finite number of agents has a Nash equilibrium. We characterize all Nash equilibria for the case of two agents.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
Jerim Kim’s research was supported by Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Science, ICT & Future Planning, South Korea ( 2016R1C1B1016602 ). Bara Kim’s research was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government (MSIP) ( NRF-2017R1A2B4012676 ).
Copyright 2018 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
- Asymmetric valuations
- Heterogeneous items
- Lagrange multiplier
- Lottery Blotto game
- Nash equilibria
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics