An Anti-folk Theorem in Overlapping Generations Games with Limited Observability

Kiho Yoon

doi:10.1006/redy.2000.0127

An Anti-folk Theorem in Overlapping Generations Games with Limited Observability

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We study the effect of limited observability on the possibility of cooperation in a simple overlapping generations model. If new entrants can observe only the recent history of the game, then cooperation cannot be sustained for certain classes of games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	736-745
Number of pages	10
Journal	Review of Economic Dynamics
Volume	4
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/redy.2000.0127
Publication status	Published - 2001 Jul
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Anti-folk theorem
limited observability
overlapping generations games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1006/redy.2000.0127

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An Anti-folk Theorem in Overlapping Generations Games with Limited Observability

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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