TY - JOUR
T1 - Collective Proofreading and the Optimal Voting Rule
AU - Kim, Duk Gyoo
AU - Lee, Jinhyuk
AU - Shin, Euncheol
N1 - Funding Information:
Duk Gyoo Kim greatly acknowledges financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation)–Project-ID 139943784–SFB 884 at the University of Mannheim. Jinhyuk Lee's work is supported by a Korea University Grant (K1823451). Euncheol Shin's work is supported by KAIST Faculty Research Grant. We thank Hans Peter Grüner, Jinhee Jo, Charles Louis-Sidois, and Kirill Pogorelskiy for their helpful suggestions and comments. All the authors equally contributed to this paper.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul.
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - Policy decisions often involve a repeated proofreading process before implementation. We present a dynamic model of proofreading decisions by a heterogeneous committee before implementing a risky policy. The proofreading process is necessary because the risky policy contains an unknown number of errors. Proofreading continues as long as a qualified majority votes for continuation. Once the proofreading process ends, and the policy is implemented, members receive heterogeneous penalties based on the remaining errors. We characterize the optimal voting rule given the costs and penalties for the committee. We find that any qualified voting rule, including majority rule, for proofreading is inefficient.
AB - Policy decisions often involve a repeated proofreading process before implementation. We present a dynamic model of proofreading decisions by a heterogeneous committee before implementing a risky policy. The proofreading process is necessary because the risky policy contains an unknown number of errors. Proofreading continues as long as a qualified majority votes for continuation. Once the proofreading process ends, and the policy is implemented, members receive heterogeneous penalties based on the remaining errors. We characterize the optimal voting rule given the costs and penalties for the committee. We find that any qualified voting rule, including majority rule, for proofreading is inefficient.
KW - Collective decision
KW - optimal proofreading
KW - optimal voting rule
KW - qualified majority rule
KW - representative agent
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85124821212&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/1226508X.2022.2040379
DO - 10.1080/1226508X.2022.2040379
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85124821212
SN - 1226-508X
VL - 51
SP - 1
EP - 17
JO - Global Economic Review
JF - Global Economic Review
IS - 1
ER -