We consider a general unobservable queueing model in which customers are allowed to join or balk upon arrival. The service provider charges the same admission fee to all joining customers. All joining customers receive the same reward and incur heterogeneous waiting cost rates. We show that the socially optimal arrival rate is greater than or equal to the profit maximizing arrival rate. Equivalently, the socially optimal admission fee is smaller than or equal to the profit maximizing admission fee.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
We are grateful to the Area Editor and the reviewer for their valuable comments and suggestions, which greatly improved this paper. B. Kim’s research was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government (MSIT) (No. 2020R1A2B5B01001864 ). J. Kim’s research was supported by Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Education (No. 2020R1F1A1A01065568 ) and was financially supported by the Research Year of Chungbuk National University in 2020, South Korea .
© 2021 Elsevier B.V.
- Optimal arrival rate
- Optimal price
- Unobservable queue
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Management Science and Operations Research
- Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
- Applied Mathematics