Abstract
We examine mixed bundling in a competitive environment that incorporates vertical product differentiation. We show that, compared to the equilibrium without bundling, (i) prices, profits and social welfare are lower, whereas (ii) consumer surplus is higher in the equilibrium with mixed bundling. In addition, the population of consumers who purchase both products from the same firm is larger in the equilibrium with mixed bundling. These results are largely in line with those obtained in the previous literature on competitive mixed bundling with horizontal differentiation. Further, we conduct a comparative static analysis with respect to changes in quality differentiation parameters. When the quality gap between brands narrows under no bundling and symmetric mixed bundling, prices and profits decrease. When quality differentiation is asymmetric across products, however, complicated effects occur on prices and profits due to strategic interdependence that mixed bundling creates.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 50 |
Journal | B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy |
Volume | 12 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2012 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:∗We thank the editor and two anonymous referees for many invaluable suggestions. The second author acknowledges that this work was supported by a National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean government (NRF-2010-330-B00085).
Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2012 De Gruyter. All rights reserved.
Keywords
- Competitive bundling
- Mixed bundling
- Quality advantage
- Vertical differentiation
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)