Abstract
We consider an unobservable M/G/1 queue in which customers are allowed to join or balk upon arrival. The service provider charges the same admission fee to all joining customers. All joining customers receive a reward from completion of service and incur a waiting cost. The reward and waiting cost rate are random, however the customers know their own values upon arrival. We characterize the customer's equilibrium strategy and the optimal prices associated with profit and social welfare maximization.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 152-156 |
Number of pages | 5 |
Journal | Operations Research Letters |
Volume | 48 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2020 Mar |
Keywords
- Equilibrium strategy
- Optimal price
- Profit rate
- Social benefit rate
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Software
- Management Science and Operations Research
- Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
- Applied Mathematics