Abstract
The Medicaid coverage “cliff” occurs when Medicare beneficiaries with household income exceeding 100% of the federal poverty level lose eligibility for supplemental Medicaid coverage. Using a regression discontinuity design with data from Medical Expenditure Panel Survey and National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey for 2007–2019, we demonstrate that the cliff increases out-of-pocket spending by 25% and the probability of experiencing problems paying medical bills by 44.4% without decreases in overall health care spending. However, there is evidence that near-poor Medicare beneficiaries changed behavior in response to the cliff, increasing the use of high-value diagnostic and preventive testing by 8.8% and enrollment in a more affordable plan by 12.2%. The cliff does not encourage healthy behavior.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 105-153 |
Number of pages | 49 |
Journal | Health Economics (United Kingdom) |
Volume | 34 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2025 Jan |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2024 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Keywords
- health care spending and utilization
- health-related behavior
- low-income
- Medicaid
- Medicaid coverage cliff
- Medicare
- Medicare advantage
- out-of-pocket spending
- regression discontinuity design
- supplemental coverage
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Health Policy