Entry Deterrence and Free Riding in License Auctions: Incumbent Heterogeneity and Monotonicity

Biung Ghi Ju, Seung Han Yoo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


We examine free riding for entry deterrence in license auctions with heterogeneous incumbents. We establish the monotonicity of randomized preemptive bidding equilibria: an incumbent with a higher entry-loss rate has greater free-riding incentive, choosing a lower deterring probability. We then identify conditions for the existence of a series of fully or partially participating equilibria such that two or more incumbents with bounded heterogeneity in their entry-loss rates participate in randomized preemptive bidding. As an application, we examine a simple case of a bipartite group of participating incumbents consisting of one "leader"and many "followers". We show that the policy of limiting the leader's participation (set-asides for entrants, limiting participation of incumbents with excessive market shares, etc.) may or may not increase entry probability.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)199-231
Number of pages33
JournalB.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2022 Jan 1

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.


  • asymmetric auctions
  • entry deterrence
  • free-rider problem

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Economics,Econometrics and Finance


Dive into the research topics of 'Entry Deterrence and Free Riding in License Auctions: Incumbent Heterogeneity and Monotonicity'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this