Equilibrium in a war of attrition with an option to fight decisively

Geofferey Jiyun Kim, Bara Kim, Jeongsim Kim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We develop a symmetric incomplete-information continuous-time two-player war-of-attrition game with an option to fight decisively. We show that there exists an essentially unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Under equilibrium, the game does not end immediately, and a costly delay persists even with the availability of the fighting option that ends the game if chosen. In addition, there exists a critical time in which a fight occurs unless a player resigns before that time.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)326-330
Number of pages5
JournalOperations Research Letters
Volume47
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019 Jul

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
We are grateful to the reviewer for valuable comments and suggestions. B. Kim’s research was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government (MSIP) ( NRF-2017R1A2B4012676 ). J. Kim’s research was supported by Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Education ( 2017R1D1A1B03029542 ).

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Elsevier B.V.

Keywords

  • Bayesian Nash equilibrium
  • Incomplete information
  • War of attrition

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Equilibrium in a war of attrition with an option to fight decisively'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this