TY - JOUR
T1 - Equilibrium in a war of attrition with an option to fight decisively
AU - Kim, Geofferey Jiyun
AU - Kim, Bara
AU - Kim, Jeongsim
N1 - Funding Information:
We are grateful to the reviewer for valuable comments and suggestions. B. Kim’s research was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government (MSIP) ( NRF-2017R1A2B4012676 ). J. Kim’s research was supported by Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Education ( 2017R1D1A1B03029542 ).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2019/7
Y1 - 2019/7
N2 - We develop a symmetric incomplete-information continuous-time two-player war-of-attrition game with an option to fight decisively. We show that there exists an essentially unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Under equilibrium, the game does not end immediately, and a costly delay persists even with the availability of the fighting option that ends the game if chosen. In addition, there exists a critical time in which a fight occurs unless a player resigns before that time.
AB - We develop a symmetric incomplete-information continuous-time two-player war-of-attrition game with an option to fight decisively. We show that there exists an essentially unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Under equilibrium, the game does not end immediately, and a costly delay persists even with the availability of the fighting option that ends the game if chosen. In addition, there exists a critical time in which a fight occurs unless a player resigns before that time.
KW - Bayesian Nash equilibrium
KW - Incomplete information
KW - War of attrition
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85067255675&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.orl.2019.05.005
DO - 10.1016/j.orl.2019.05.005
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85067255675
SN - 0167-6377
VL - 47
SP - 326
EP - 330
JO - Operations Research Letters
JF - Operations Research Letters
IS - 4
ER -