Equilibrium in a war of attrition with an option to fight decisively

Geofferey Jiyun Kim; Bara Kim; Jeongsim Kim

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2019.05.005

Equilibrium in a war of attrition with an option to fight decisively

Geofferey Jiyun Kim, Bara Kim, Jeongsim Kim

Department of Mathematics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We develop a symmetric incomplete-information continuous-time two-player war-of-attrition game with an option to fight decisively. We show that there exists an essentially unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Under equilibrium, the game does not end immediately, and a costly delay persists even with the availability of the fighting option that ends the game if chosen. In addition, there exists a critical time in which a fight occurs unless a player resigns before that time.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	326-330
Number of pages	5
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	47
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.05.005
Publication status	Published - 2019 Jul

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
We are grateful to the reviewer for valuable comments and suggestions. B. Kim’s research was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government (MSIP) ( NRF-2017R1A2B4012676 ). J. Kim’s research was supported by Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Education ( 2017R1D1A1B03029542 ).

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Elsevier B.V.

Keywords

Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Incomplete information
War of attrition

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Software
Management Science and Operations Research
Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
Applied Mathematics

Access to Document

10.1016/j.orl.2019.05.005

Cite this

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abstract = "We develop a symmetric incomplete-information continuous-time two-player war-of-attrition game with an option to fight decisively. We show that there exists an essentially unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Under equilibrium, the game does not end immediately, and a costly delay persists even with the availability of the fighting option that ends the game if chosen. In addition, there exists a critical time in which a fight occurs unless a player resigns before that time.",

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Equilibrium in a war of attrition with an option to fight decisively

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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