Evolutionary stability in games with continuous strategy space: Recent developments

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The classical evolutionary game theory, pioneered by Maynard Smith and Price (1973), was initially developed in the context of uni-population games with discrete strategy space. Recently some progress has been made in extending the original idea of Maynard Smith and his collaborators into uni-population games with continuous strategy space (Apaloo, 1997; Christiansen, 1991; Cressman, 2006; Eshel, 1983). The current paper reviews them in a unifying framework, and provides some new theorems linking various concepts of evolutionary stability proposed by different authors.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)63-78
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2012 Mar


  • Continuous stability
  • Evolutionarily stable non-invader strategy
  • Local m-stability
  • Local superiority
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Uninvadability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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