Fault injection attack on A5/3

Kitae Jeong*, Yuseop Lee, Jaechul Sung, Seokhie Hong

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    5 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    In this paper, we propose a fault injection attack on A5/3 used in GSM. This attack is based on the fault assumption in [9]. That is, it is assumed that we can decrease the number of rounds in block cipher KASUMI of A5/3 by injecting some faults. With small number of fault injections, we can recover the session key of A5/3 supporting a 64-bit session key. This is the first known cryptanalytic result on A5/3 so far.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationProceedings - 9th IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications, ISPA 2011
    Pages300-303
    Number of pages4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2011
    Event9th IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications, ISPA 2011 - Busan, Korea, Republic of
    Duration: 2011 May 262011 May 28

    Publication series

    NameProceedings - 9th IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications, ISPA 2011

    Other

    Other9th IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications, ISPA 2011
    Country/TerritoryKorea, Republic of
    CityBusan
    Period11/5/2611/5/28

    Keywords

    • A5/3
    • Cryptanalysis
    • Fault injection attack
    • GSM

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Computer Science Applications

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