First-order side channel attacks on Zhang's countermeasures

Heeseok Kim, Dong Guk Han, Seokhie Hong

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


Zhang's three countermeasures are known to be secure against certain first-order side channel attacks such as differential power analysis and correlation power analysis. This security comes from the countermeasures' use of random points to blind the message and random integers to blind the secret scalar. In this paper, we propose first-order side channel attack methods that can perfectly break these three countermeasures. Even though Zhang's countermeasures use random points and random integers our attacks are made possible by the fact that intermediate values computed by these countermeasures are dependent on specific values that we can guess. The experimental results verify that the proposed attack methods can successfully break existing countermeasures.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)4051-4060
Number of pages10
JournalInformation Sciences
Issue number18
Publication statusPublished - 2011 Sept 15

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This work was supported by the IT R&D program of MKE, Korea [Development of Privacy Enhancing Cryptography on Ubiquitous Computing Environment].

Funding Information:
This work was supported by research program 2011 of Kookmin University in Korea.


  • Countermeasure
  • Differential power analysis
  • Elliptic curve
  • Scalar multiplication
  • Side channel attacks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Information Systems and Management
  • Artificial Intelligence


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