HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) cookies are widely used on the web to enhance communication efficiency between a client and a server by storing stateful information. However, cookies may contain private and sensitive information about users. Thus, in order to guarantee the security of cookies, most web browsers and servers support not only Transport Layer Security (TLS) but also other mechanisms such as HTTP Strict Transport Security and cookie flags. However, a recent study has shown that it is possible to circumvent cookie flags in HTTPS by exploiting a vulnerability in HTTP software that allows message truncation. In this paper, we propose a novel cookie hijacking attack called rotten~cookie which deactivates cookie flags even if they are protected by TLS by exploiting a weakness in HTTP in terms of integrity checks. According to our investigation, all major browsers ignore uninterpretable sections of the header of HTTP response messages and accept incorrect formats without any rejection. We demonstrate that, when combined with TLS or application vulnerabilities, this form of attack can obtain private cookies by removing cookie flags. Thus, the attacker can impersonate a legitimate user in the eyes of the server when cookies are used as an authentication token. We prove the practicality of our attack by demonstrating that our attack can lead five major web browsers to accept a cookie without any cookie flags. We thus present a mitigation strategy for the transport layer to preserve cookie security against our attack.
|Number of pages||12|
|Journal||IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security|
|Publication status||Published - 2020|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
Manuscript received May 29, 2018; revised January 29, 2019, June 21, 2019 and August 6, 2019; accepted August 13, 2019. Date of publication August 29, 2019; date of current version December 11, 2019. This work was supported in part by the Institute of Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) Grant funded by the Korea Government (MSIT) under Grant 2019-0-00533 (Research on CPU Vulnerability Detection and Validation) and in part by the Research Fund of Signal Intelligence Research Center supervised by the Defense Acquisition Program Administration and the Agency for Defense Development, South Korea. The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Dr. Issa Traore. (Hyunsoo Kwon, Hyunjae Nam, and Sangtae Lee contributed equally to this work.) (Corresponding author: Junbeom Hur.) The authors are with the Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Korea University, Seoul 156-756, South Korea (e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org; email@example.com; firstname.lastname@example.org; email@example.com; firstname.lastname@example.org). Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS.2019.2938416
© 2005-2012 IEEE.
- Cookie theft attack
- hypertext transfer protocol
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
- Computer Networks and Communications