Informational disadvantage and bargaining power

Sung Hyuk Ko; Byoung Heon Jun

Informational disadvantage and bargaining power

Sung Hyuk Ko, Byoung Heon Jun

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We consider an alternating offer model where the size of the to-tal surplus is stochastic. Furthermore, the size changes during the time when the offer is being considered. As a result the responder may obtain more information than the proposer. We analyze how the asymmetry in ability to access good information affects the bargaining power, both in terms of the resulting share and in terms of the delay in agreement.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	9-19
Number of pages	11
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
Volume	20
Issue number	1
Publication status	Published - 2009 Mar

Keywords

Alternating offer bargaining
Informational advantage
Stochastic surplus

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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Informational disadvantage and bargaining power

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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