Abstract
Scholars of international relations and public policy recognize that quasi-private actors supply governance services alongside governmental actors. We explore how membership in the dominant trade regime, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/the World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) influences countries’ incentives to join the quasi-private regime, International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Both global regimes seek to remove trade barriers; the former focuses on tariff and non-tariff obstacles, and the latter on technical barriers. While any firm can subscribe to over 18,000 ISO standards, only national standards bodies, one per country, can become ISO members. We posit that given the substantial political costs of joining GATT/WTO and the relatively low entry barriers to joining the ISO, high trading countries might view the ISO as a (partial) functional equivalent of the GATT/WTO. Our empirical analysis of ISO membership dynamics over the period 1951–2005 lends support to our argument.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 352-364 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Global Policy |
Volume | 9 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2018 Sept |
Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2018 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Global and Planetary Change
- Economics and Econometrics
- Political Science and International Relations
- Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
- Law