Market selection with endogenous information revelation

Scott Condie, Seung Han Yoo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper uses the dynamic general equilibrium model developed by Mailath and Sandroni (2003) but allows information revelation to be determined endogenously. The paper establishes sufficient conditions on the exogenous information arrival process that ensure that an investor who receives unique information infinitely often drives out an investor who receives unique information only finitely often.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)201-215
Number of pages15
JournalInternational Journal of Economic Theory
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2011 Jun
Externally publishedYes


  • Learning
  • Market selection
  • Rational expectations

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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