Mutual information analysis for three-phase dynamic current mode logic against side-channel attack

Hyunmin Kim, Dong Guk Han, Seokhie Hong

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    To date, many different kinds of logic styles for hardware countermeasures have been developed; for example, SABL, TDPL, and DyCML. Current mode-based logic styles are useful as they consume less power compared to voltage mode-based logic styles such as SABL and TDPL. Although we developed TPDyCML in 2012 and presented it at the WISA 2012 conference, we have further optimized it in this paper using a binary decision diagram algorithm and confirmed its properties through a practical implementation of the AES S-box. In this paper, we will explain the outcome of HSPICE simulations, which included correlation power attacks, on AES S-boxes configured using a compact NMOS tree constructed from either SABL, CMOS, TDPL, DyCML, or TPDyCML. In addition, to compare the performance of each logic style in greater detail, we will carry out a mutual information analysis (MIA). Our results confirm that our logic style has good properties as a hardware countermeasure and 15% less information leakage than those secure logic styles used in our MIA.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)584-594
    Number of pages11
    JournalETRI Journal
    Volume37
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2015 Jun 1

    Bibliographical note

    Publisher Copyright:
    © 2015 ETRI.

    Keywords

    • Information theoretic analysis
    • Mutual information analysis
    • Side-channel attack
    • TPDyCML

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Electronic, Optical and Magnetic Materials
    • General Computer Science
    • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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