Non-cooperative bargaining and union formation

Byoung Heon Jun

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

55 Citations (Scopus)


We study a union formation decision problem when workers consist of two groups distinguished by different productivities. Workers may form either a joint union or two separate unions. The whole decision process is modelled as an extensive-form bargaining game. Workers form a joint union when the sizes or productivities of the groups are similar. In the first case, there is a wage differential which is more (less) than proportional to the productivity difference if the size of the more productive is smaller (larger) than that of the less productive. In the second case, there is no wage differential.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)59-76
Number of pages18
JournalReview of Economic Studies
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1989

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Acknowledgement. I am grateful to Ken Binmore and Xavier Vivesfor their encouragement and valuable suggestions. This paper is a revised version of Chapter 2 of my Ph.D. thesis at the University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful to my advisor Richard Kihlstrom for helpful advice and comments. I would also like to thank Douglas Gale, David Grey, George Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Avner Shaked, John Sutton, Paul Taubman, Asher Wolinsky and seminar participants. Comments from Kevin Roberts and a referee were helpful in improving the paper. Of course, any remaining shortcomings are of my own. Financial support from Alfred P. Sloan Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship is gratefully acknowledged.

Copyright 2016 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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