TY - GEN
T1 - On a security model for a retrieval system over encrypted database
AU - Park, Hyun A.
AU - Byun, Jin Wook
AU - Park, Jae Hyun
AU - Lee, Dong Hoon
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - Although most proposed security schemes have scrutinized their own security models for protecting different types of threats and attacks, this naturally causes a problem as follows if a security analysis tool would fit a certain scheme, it may not be proper to other schemes. In order to address this problem, this paper analyzes how security requirements of each paper could be different by comparing with two schemes: Agrawal et al.'s scheme OPES (Order Preserving Encryption Scheme) and Zdonik et al.'s FCE (Fast Comparison Encryption) Zdonik et al. have formally disproved the security of Agrawal et al.'s scheme OPES. Thereafter, some scholars have wondered whether the OPES can guarantee its applicability in a real world for its insecurity or not. However, the analysis by Zdonik et al. does not have valid objectivity because they used the security model INFO-CPA-DB for their scheme FCE to analyze Agrawal et al.'s scheme OPES, in spite of the differences between two schemes. In order to analyze any scheme correctly and apply it to a real world properly, the analysis tool should be comprehensively standardized. We re-analyze Zdonik et al.'s analysis for OPES and then propose general formalizations of security and privacy for all of the encrypted retrieval systems. Finally, we recommend the minimum level of security requirements under our formal definitions. Additional considerations should be also supplemented in accordance with the conditions of each system.
AB - Although most proposed security schemes have scrutinized their own security models for protecting different types of threats and attacks, this naturally causes a problem as follows if a security analysis tool would fit a certain scheme, it may not be proper to other schemes. In order to address this problem, this paper analyzes how security requirements of each paper could be different by comparing with two schemes: Agrawal et al.'s scheme OPES (Order Preserving Encryption Scheme) and Zdonik et al.'s FCE (Fast Comparison Encryption) Zdonik et al. have formally disproved the security of Agrawal et al.'s scheme OPES. Thereafter, some scholars have wondered whether the OPES can guarantee its applicability in a real world for its insecurity or not. However, the analysis by Zdonik et al. does not have valid objectivity because they used the security model INFO-CPA-DB for their scheme FCE to analyze Agrawal et al.'s scheme OPES, in spite of the differences between two schemes. In order to analyze any scheme correctly and apply it to a real world properly, the analysis tool should be comprehensively standardized. We re-analyze Zdonik et al.'s analysis for OPES and then propose general formalizations of security and privacy for all of the encrypted retrieval systems. Finally, we recommend the minimum level of security requirements under our formal definitions. Additional considerations should be also supplemented in accordance with the conditions of each system.
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M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84864266583
SN - 9788988678442
T3 - Proceedings - 7th International Conference on Information Processing and Management, ICIPM 2011
SP - 76
EP - 82
BT - Proceedings - 7th International Conference on Information Processing and Management, ICIPM 2011
T2 - 7th International Conference on Information Processing and Management, ICIPM 2011
Y2 - 29 November 2011 through 1 December 2012
ER -