On asymmetry in all-pay auctions

Kiho Yoon

On asymmetry in all-pay auctions

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper examines the role of asymmetry in all-pay auctions. In particular, this paper decomposes a change in players’ valuations into the absolute change and the relative change, and analyzes how these changes affect total expenditures. An increase in the sum of players’ valuations increases total expenditures but an increase in asymmetry among players’ valuations tends to decrease total expenditures under both complete and incomplete information. This paper also studies the optimal all-pay auction design problem.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	67-83
Number of pages	17
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
Volume	28
Issue number	1
Publication status	Published - 2017 Mar

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This work was supported by a Korea University Grant (K1613421).

Publisher Copyright:
© 2017, Korean Econometric Society. All rights reserved.

Keywords

All-pay auctions
Asymmetry
Deterministic contests

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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On asymmetry in all-pay auctions

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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Cite this