On Renegotiation-Proof Collusion under Imperfect Public Information

Kiho Yoon

doi:10.1006/jeth.1998.2500

On Renegotiation-Proof Collusion under Imperfect Public Information

Kiho Yoon^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We construct a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium in Green and Porter's (1984,Econometrica52, 87-100) imperfect public information model, which Pareto-dominates the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D43, D82.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	328-336
Number of pages	9
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	85
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2500
Publication status	Published - 1999 Apr
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Renegotiation-proof equilibrium; collusion; Cournot-Nash equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1006/jeth.1998.2500

Cite this

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KW - Renegotiation-proof equilibrium; collusion; Cournot-Nash equilibrium

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On Renegotiation-Proof Collusion under Imperfect Public Information

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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