On the optimal allocation of prizes in contests

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We characterize the optimal structure of prizes in contests, when the contest designer is interested in the maximization of either the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. The all-pay auction framework in the present paper makes it possible to derive most of the results in Moldovanu and Sela's (2001, American Economic Review, 542-558; 2006, Journal of Economic Theory, 70-96) incomplete-information model of contests in a particularly simple fashion, as well as to obtain new results.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-12
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Mar


  • All-pay auctions
  • Contests
  • Optimal structure
  • Prizes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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