On the optimal allocation of prizes in contests

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    We characterize the optimal structure of prizes in contests, when the contest designer is interested in the maximization of either the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. The all-pay auction framework in the present paper makes it possible to derive most of the results in Moldovanu and Sela's (2001, American Economic Review, 542-558; 2006, Journal of Economic Theory, 70-96) incomplete-information model of contests in a particularly simple fashion, as well as to obtain new results.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)1-12
    Number of pages12
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
    Volume25
    Issue number1
    Publication statusPublished - 2014 Mar

    Keywords

    • All-pay auctions
    • Contests
    • Optimal structure
    • Prizes

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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