Abstract
We characterize the optimal structure of prizes in contests, when the contest designer is interested in the maximization of either the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. The all-pay auction framework in the present paper makes it possible to derive most of the results in Moldovanu and Sela's (2001, American Economic Review, 542-558; 2006, Journal of Economic Theory, 70-96) incomplete-information model of contests in a particularly simple fashion, as well as to obtain new results.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-12 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 Mar |
Keywords
- All-pay auctions
- Contests
- Optimal structure
- Prizes
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics