Optimal licensing of technology in the face of (asymmetric) competition

Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar G. Wolfstetter

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)


We reconsider the optimal technology licensing by an incumbent firm facing multiple competitors. First, we cover the case of one license and show that competition has a drastic effect on optimal two-part tariffs. We also consider license auctions and design a more profitable dynamic mechanism. Next, we allow the licensor to award multiple licenses and design a dynamic mechanism that extracts the maximum industry profit. It awards licenses to all firms, prescribes maximum permitted royalty rates and positive fixed fees, and is more profitable than other dynamic mechanisms. Finally we show that a slight modification of that mechanism is also optimal for outside patent holders.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)32-53
Number of pages22
JournalInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Sept

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Elsevier B.V.


  • Dynamic mechanisms
  • Menu auctions
  • Patent licensing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Industrial relations
  • Aerospace Engineering
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
  • Strategy and Management
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering


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