Optimal quality scores in sponsored search auctions: Full extraction of advertisers' surplus

Kiho Yoon

doi:10.2202/1935-1704.1649

Optimal quality scores in sponsored search auctions: Full extraction of advertisers' surplus

Kiho Yoon

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper shows that the quality scores in sponsored search auctions can be optimally chosen to extract all the advertisers' surplus. The reason for the full extraction result is that the quality scores may effectively set all the bidders' valuations equal to the highest valuation, which induces intense bidding competition.

Original language	English
Article number	28
Journal	B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Volume	10
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1649
Publication status	Published - 2010

Keywords

full extraction
online advertising
quality score
sponsored search

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Economics,Econometrics and Finance

Access to Document

10.2202/1935-1704.1649

Cite this

@article{284f4453f58b44b7b63088cc6b1ac93f,

title = "Optimal quality scores in sponsored search auctions: Full extraction of advertisers' surplus",

abstract = "This paper shows that the quality scores in sponsored search auctions can be optimally chosen to extract all the advertisers' surplus. The reason for the full extraction result is that the quality scores may effectively set all the bidders' valuations equal to the highest valuation, which induces intense bidding competition.",

keywords = "full extraction, online advertising, quality score, sponsored search",

author = "Kiho Yoon",

year = "2010",

doi = "10.2202/1935-1704.1649",

language = "English",

volume = "10",

journal = "B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics",

issn = "1935-1704",

publisher = "Berkeley Electronic Press",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Optimal quality scores in sponsored search auctions

T2 - Full extraction of advertisers' surplus

AU - Yoon, Kiho

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - This paper shows that the quality scores in sponsored search auctions can be optimally chosen to extract all the advertisers' surplus. The reason for the full extraction result is that the quality scores may effectively set all the bidders' valuations equal to the highest valuation, which induces intense bidding competition.

AB - This paper shows that the quality scores in sponsored search auctions can be optimally chosen to extract all the advertisers' surplus. The reason for the full extraction result is that the quality scores may effectively set all the bidders' valuations equal to the highest valuation, which induces intense bidding competition.

KW - full extraction

KW - online advertising

KW - quality score

KW - sponsored search

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77955266110&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.2202/1935-1704.1649

DO - 10.2202/1935-1704.1649

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:77955266110

SN - 1935-1704

VL - 10

JO - B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

JF - B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

IS - 1

M1 - 28

ER -

Optimal quality scores in sponsored search auctions: Full extraction of advertisers' surplus

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this