Optimal quality scores in sponsored search auctions: Full extraction of advertisers' surplus

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    5 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This paper shows that the quality scores in sponsored search auctions can be optimally chosen to extract all the advertisers' surplus. The reason for the full extraction result is that the quality scores may effectively set all the bidders' valuations equal to the highest valuation, which induces intense bidding competition.

    Original languageEnglish
    Article number28
    JournalB.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
    Volume10
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2010

    Keywords

    • full extraction
    • online advertising
    • quality score
    • sponsored search

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • General Economics,Econometrics and Finance

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Optimal quality scores in sponsored search auctions: Full extraction of advertisers' surplus'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this