Optimal robust allocation of private goods

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1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We characterize the optimal robust mechanisms for the allocation of private objects, where robust mechanisms are those mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality, and ex-post no budget deficit, and optimal robust mechanisms are the ones that maximize the expected sum of players’ payoffs among all robust mechanisms. With a certain assumption on the payoff of the lowest possible type, we provide a complete description of optimal robust mechanisms with any number of players and objects.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-15
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
Volume29
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Dec

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
∗This work was supported by a Korea University Grant (K1709791). †Department of Economics, Korea University, 145 Anam-ro, Seongbuk-gu, 02841; kiho@korea.ac.kr; Tel.: +82-2-3290-2222; Fax.: +82-2-3290-2716

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Korean Econometric Society. All rights reserved.

Keywords

  • Budget balance
  • Dominant strategy
  • Ex-post individual rationality
  • Robust mechanism design

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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