PCIe Side-channel Attack on I/O Device via RDMA-enabled Network Card

Hodong Kim; Junbeom Hur

doi:10.1109/ICTC55196.2022.9952853

PCIe Side-channel Attack on I/O Device via RDMA-enabled Network Card

Hodong Kim, Junbeom Hur

Department of Computer Science and Engineering

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Microarchitectural side-channel attacks aim to steal sensitive information by exploiting various shared resources of systems. Recently, several studies proposed PCIe-based microar-chitectural side-channel attacks. Existing studies evaluated such attacks on the limited environments that utilize special-purpose system hardwares. In this study, we analyze the operating mechanism of IOMMU which manages direct memory access of PCIe devices in general system environments. Based on the result, we discuss the possibility of exploiting IOMMU to conduct a PCIe-based microarchitectural side-channel attack.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	ICTC 2022 - 13th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence
Subtitle of host publication	Accelerating Digital Transformation with ICT Innovation
Publisher	IEEE Computer Society
Pages	1468-1470
Number of pages	3
ISBN (Electronic)	9781665499392
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ICTC55196.2022.9952853
Publication status	Published - 2022
Event	13th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence, ICTC 2022 - Jeju Island, Korea, Republic of Duration: 2022 Oct 19 → 2022 Oct 21

Publication series

Name	International Conference on ICT Convergence
Volume	2022-October
ISSN (Print)	2162-1233
ISSN (Electronic)	2162-1241

Conference

Conference	13th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence, ICTC 2022
Country/Territory	Korea, Republic of
City	Jeju Island
Period	22/10/19 → 22/10/21

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT This work was supported by IITP grant funded by the MSIT, Korea (No.2019-0-00533, 2022-0-00411, IITP-2022-2021-0-01810) and Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation funded by the Ministry of Education, Korea (NRF-2021R1A6A1A13044830).

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 IEEE.

Keywords

IOMMU
Microarchitectural side-channel attack
PCIe
RNIC

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Information Systems
Computer Networks and Communications

Access to Document

10.1109/ICTC55196.2022.9952853

Cite this

Kim, H., & Hur, J. (2022). PCIe Side-channel Attack on I/O Device via RDMA-enabled Network Card. In ICTC 2022 - 13th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence: Accelerating Digital Transformation with ICT Innovation (pp. 1468-1470). (International Conference on ICT Convergence; Vol. 2022-October). IEEE Computer Society. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICTC55196.2022.9952853

PCIe Side-channel Attack on I/O Device via RDMA-enabled Network Card. / Kim, Hodong; Hur, Junbeom.
ICTC 2022 - 13th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence: Accelerating Digital Transformation with ICT Innovation. IEEE Computer Society, 2022. p. 1468-1470 (International Conference on ICT Convergence; Vol. 2022-October).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Kim, H & Hur, J 2022, PCIe Side-channel Attack on I/O Device via RDMA-enabled Network Card. in ICTC 2022 - 13th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence: Accelerating Digital Transformation with ICT Innovation. International Conference on ICT Convergence, vol. 2022-October, IEEE Computer Society, pp. 1468-1470, 13th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence, ICTC 2022, Jeju Island, Korea, Republic of, 22/10/19. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICTC55196.2022.9952853

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abstract = "Microarchitectural side-channel attacks aim to steal sensitive information by exploiting various shared resources of systems. Recently, several studies proposed PCIe-based microar-chitectural side-channel attacks. Existing studies evaluated such attacks on the limited environments that utilize special-purpose system hardwares. In this study, we analyze the operating mechanism of IOMMU which manages direct memory access of PCIe devices in general system environments. Based on the result, we discuss the possibility of exploiting IOMMU to conduct a PCIe-based microarchitectural side-channel attack.",

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note = "Funding Information: ACKNOWLEDGMENT This work was supported by IITP grant funded by the MSIT, Korea (No.2019-0-00533, 2022-0-00411, IITP-2022-2021-0-01810) and Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation funded by the Ministry of Education, Korea (NRF-2021R1A6A1A13044830). Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2022 IEEE.; 13th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence, ICTC 2022 ; Conference date: 19-10-2022 Through 21-10-2022",

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AB - Microarchitectural side-channel attacks aim to steal sensitive information by exploiting various shared resources of systems. Recently, several studies proposed PCIe-based microar-chitectural side-channel attacks. Existing studies evaluated such attacks on the limited environments that utilize special-purpose system hardwares. In this study, we analyze the operating mechanism of IOMMU which manages direct memory access of PCIe devices in general system environments. Based on the result, we discuss the possibility of exploiting IOMMU to conduct a PCIe-based microarchitectural side-channel attack.

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PCIe Side-channel Attack on I/O Device via RDMA-enabled Network Card

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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Cite this