Abstract
This paper analyzes a petty corruption model in which the entrepreneur's type is drawn from an absolutely continuous probability distribution function F over [0, 1], and perfect Bayesian equilibrium is adopted as the solution concept for a one-stage game. In the one-stage game, if there is more than one bureaucrat, no project is approved with a strictly positive probability. For an infinitely repeated game, I show that the single window policy strictly increases the social benefits in a socially optimal equilibrium.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 267-280 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | Economic Theory |
Volume | 37 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2008 Nov |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Corruption
- Economic development
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
- Repeated games
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics