Petty corruption

Seung Han Yoo

doi:10.1007/s00199-007-0299-3

Petty corruption

Seung Han Yoo

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper analyzes a petty corruption model in which the entrepreneur's type is drawn from an absolutely continuous probability distribution function F over [0, 1], and perfect Bayesian equilibrium is adopted as the solution concept for a one-stage game. In the one-stage game, if there is more than one bureaucrat, no project is approved with a strictly positive probability. For an infinitely repeated game, I show that the single window policy strictly increases the social benefits in a socially optimal equilibrium.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	267-280
Number of pages	14
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	37
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0299-3
Publication status	Published - 2008 Nov
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Corruption
Economic development
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Repeated games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1007/s00199-007-0299-3

Cite this

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AB - This paper analyzes a petty corruption model in which the entrepreneur's type is drawn from an absolutely continuous probability distribution function F over [0, 1], and perfect Bayesian equilibrium is adopted as the solution concept for a one-stage game. In the one-stage game, if there is more than one bureaucrat, no project is approved with a strictly positive probability. For an infinitely repeated game, I show that the single window policy strictly increases the social benefits in a socially optimal equilibrium.

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KW - Perfect Bayesian equilibrium

KW - Repeated games

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Petty corruption

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

UN SDGs

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