Population uncertainty and revealing contestants

Bara Kim; Seung Han Yoo

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109727

Population uncertainty and revealing contestants

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

A number of contestants randomly arrives according to a Poisson distribution. Under population uncertainty, a contest designer considers whether or not to reveal the number of players to bidders. We show that for the expected revenue, the two policies are equivalent, but for the expected winner's payment, the revealing policy dominates if the expected number of bidders is sufficiently large, whereas the concealing policy dominates if it is low.

Original language	English
Article number	109727
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	199
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109727
Publication status	Published - 2021 Feb

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Elsevier B.V.

Keywords

Contest
Environmental equivalence
Population uncertainty

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109727

Cite this

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Population uncertainty and revealing contestants

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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