Population uncertainty and revealing contestants

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    A number of contestants randomly arrives according to a Poisson distribution. Under population uncertainty, a contest designer considers whether or not to reveal the number of players to bidders. We show that for the expected revenue, the two policies are equivalent, but for the expected winner's payment, the revealing policy dominates if the expected number of bidders is sufficiently large, whereas the concealing policy dominates if it is low.

    Original languageEnglish
    Article number109727
    JournalEconomics Letters
    Volume199
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2021 Feb

    Bibliographical note

    Publisher Copyright:
    © 2021 Elsevier B.V.

    Keywords

    • Contest
    • Environmental equivalence
    • Population uncertainty

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Population uncertainty and revealing contestants'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this