Population uncertainty and revealing contestants

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A number of contestants randomly arrives according to a Poisson distribution. Under population uncertainty, a contest designer considers whether or not to reveal the number of players to bidders. We show that for the expected revenue, the two policies are equivalent, but for the expected winner's payment, the revealing policy dominates if the expected number of bidders is sufficiently large, whereas the concealing policy dominates if it is low.

Original languageEnglish
Article number109727
JournalEconomics Letters
Publication statusPublished - 2021 Feb

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Elsevier B.V.


  • Contest
  • Environmental equivalence
  • Population uncertainty

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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