Pricing and Revenue Sharing Between ISPs Under Content Sponsoring

Abylay Satybaldy, Changhee Joo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


As sponsored data with subsidized access cost gains popularity in industry, it is essential to understand its impact on the Internet service market. We investigate the interplay among Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Content Provider (CP) and End User (EU), where each player is selfish and wants to maximize its own profit. In particular, we consider multi-ISP scenarios, in which the network connectivity between the CP and the EU is jointly provided by multiple ISPs. We first model non-cooperative interaction between the players as a four-stage Stackelberg game, and derive the optimal behaviors of each player in equilibrium. Taking into account the transit price at intermediate ISP, we provide in-depth understanding on the sponsoring strategies of CP. We then study the effect of cooperation between the ISPs to the pricing structure and the traffic demand, and analyze their implications to the players. We further build our revenue sharing model based on Shapley value mechanism, and show that the collaboration of the ISPs can improve their total payoff with a higher social welfare.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)501-511
Number of pages11
JournalMobile Networks and Applications
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2021 Apr
Externally publishedYes


  • Content sponsoring
  • Cooperative game
  • Game theory
  • Internet pricing
  • Network economics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Information Systems
  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Computer Networks and Communications


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