Quality improvement incentive strategies in a supply chain

Seung Ho Yoo, Taesu Cheong

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

56 Citations (Scopus)


This paper investigates several incentive mechanisms for collaborative product quality improvement in a buyer-driven supply chain, and the impacts of those mechanisms on supply chain performance. The buyer, the Stackelberg leader, determines the sales price of a product while the supplier is responsible for production and product quality determination. We develop analytical models incorporating two reward schemes to better understand how the buyer can facilitate the supplier's quality improvement efforts. We offer managerial insights and practical guidelines for implementing quality management in the supply chain, derived from both an analytical comparison and numerical experiments.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)331-342
Number of pages12
JournalTransportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Jun

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government (MSIT) (No. NRF-2015R1C1A1A02036682 ).

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Elsevier Ltd


  • Incentive
  • Quality management
  • Reward contract
  • Supply chain
  • Target quality

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Civil and Structural Engineering
  • Transportation


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