Abstract
We consider a single, unaffiliated streaming content provider (CP) and another that is vertically integrated (affiliated) with a cellular wireless ISP. We formulate a non-cooperative game between these two CPs involving, e.g., linear demand-response to price by the end-users with long-duration sessions (e.g., streaming video), and a model as amplified noise of additional network delay jitter and reduced responsiveness to changing channel conditions by the unaffiliated CP. The effect of effective additional side-payments from the unaffiliated CP to the ISP, as may be set by a government regulator, is studied at Stackelberg equilibrium both analytically and numerically.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | 2017 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017 |
Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |
Pages | 1-8 |
Number of pages | 8 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9783901882982 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2017 Jul 1 |
Event | 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017 - Tokyo, Japan Duration: 2017 Nov 26 → 2017 Nov 30 |
Publication series
Name | 2017 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017 |
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Volume | 2018-January |
Other
Other | 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2017 |
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Country/Territory | Japan |
City | Tokyo |
Period | 17/11/26 → 17/11/30 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:This research was supported by NSF CNS grant 1526133. S. Baek was supported in part by NRF grant by MSIP, Korea (NRF-2016R1A2B1014934). A poster version of this paper was presented at ACM MOBICOM N2 Women Workshop in Oct. 3, 2016. Contact the corresponding author G. Kesidis at [email protected] 1Here, ISPs that service end-users.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 IFIP.
Copyright:
Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Information Systems and Management
- Control and Optimization
- Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality