Abstract
In this paper, we present a related key truncated differential attack on 27 rounds of XTEA which is the best known attack so far. With an expected success rate of 96.9%, we can attack 27 rounds of XTEA using 220.5 chosen plaintexts and with a complexity of 2115.15 27-round XTEA encryptions. We also propose several attacks on GOST. First, we present a distinguishing attack on full-round GOST, which can distinguish it from a random permutation with probability 1-2-64 using a related key differential characteristic. We also show that H. Seki et al.'s idea combined with our related key differential characteristic can be applied to attack 31 rounds of GOST . Lastly, we propose a related key differential attack on full-round GOST. In this attack, we can recover 12 bits of the master key with 235 chosen plaintexts, 236 encryption operations and an expected success rate of 91.7%.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 299-316 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
Volume | 3017 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2004 |
Keywords
- Differential characteristic
- Distinguishing attack
- GOST
- Related key differential attack
- XTEA
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Theoretical Computer Science
- Computer Science(all)