Security bid auctions for agency contracts

Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar G. Wolfstetter

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)


A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of hidden action and hidden information. Securities range from cash to equity and call options. “Steeper” securities are better surplus extractors, yet reduce effort incentives. In view of this trade-off, a hybrid share auction that includes a cash reward to the winner, a minimum share, and an option to call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by adding output targets a hybrid share auction can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)289-319
Number of pages31
JournalReview of Economic Design
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Nov 28

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2014, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.


  • Agency problems
  • Auctions and security design
  • Mechanism design

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Economics,Econometrics and Finance


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