Abstract
Recently, a non-interactive identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme was proposed for achieving CCA-security. In the paper, we show that the identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme is unfortunately vulnerable to a collusion attack. The collusion of a proxy and a malicious user enables two parties to derive other honest user's private key and thereby decrypt ciphertexts intended for the honest user.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1260-1262 |
Number of pages | 3 |
Journal | Information Processing Letters |
Volume | 109 |
Issue number | 23-24 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2009 Nov 15 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:1 This work was supported by the IT R&D program of MKE/KEIT [2008-F-036-02, Development of Anonymity-based u-knowledge Security Technology].
Funding Information:
This work was supported by the IT R&D program of MKE/IITA [2009-S-001-02, Development of Security Technology for Car-Healthcare].
Copyright:
Copyright 2009 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
Keywords
- CCA-security
- Collusion attack
- Cryptography
- Identity-based proxy re-encryption
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Theoretical Computer Science
- Signal Processing
- Information Systems
- Computer Science Applications