Side Channel Vulnerability in Parity Computation of Generic Key Reconciliation Process on QKD

Gyu Sang Kim, Dongjun Park, Hee Seok Kim, Seokhie Hong

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a key exchange protocol based on quantum physics, and the key reconciliation process is a necessary process that should not be omitted from QKD in correcting discrepancies between the key sent and the one received. In this paper, we propose the single trace side channel attack on the parity sum, which is a common operation in general error-correcting algorithms. We show that one can fully recover the secret key using a power consumption trace captured when a processor computes the parity sum.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationICTC 2021 - 12th International Conference on ICT Convergence
Subtitle of host publicationBeyond the Pandemic Era with ICT Convergence Innovation
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages257-261
Number of pages5
ISBN (Electronic)9781665423830
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021
Event12th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence, ICTC 2021 - Jeju Island, Korea, Republic of
Duration: 2021 Oct 202021 Oct 22

Publication series

NameInternational Conference on ICT Convergence
Volume2021-October
ISSN (Print)2162-1233
ISSN (Electronic)2162-1241

Conference

Conference12th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence, ICTC 2021
Country/TerritoryKorea, Republic of
CityJeju Island
Period21/10/2021/10/22

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 IEEE.

Keywords

  • quantum key distribution
  • side channel attack
  • single trace attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Information Systems
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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