Single trace side-channel attack on key reconciliation in quantum key distribution system and its efficient countermeasures

Dongjun Park, Gyu Sang Kim, Donghoe Heo, Suhri Kim, Hee Seok Kim, Seokhie Hong

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Although quantum mechanics guarantees the security of the quantum key distribution system, it is crucial to examine whether the implementation flaws can lead to the disclosure of sensitive information. In this paper, we propose the side-channel attack on the key reconciliation in the quantum key distribution system. In this system, the sifted key and the syndrome are used to derive a shared secret key between two users. From our attack, these can be fully recovered through a single power consumption trace measured during the syndrome computation on the sender's side. Additionally, we propose efficient countermeasures to thwart such side-channel attacks.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)36-40
Number of pages5
JournalICT Express
Volume7
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021 Mar

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This work was supported by the Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Science and ICT, South Korea under Grant NRF-2019R1A2C2088960 .

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 The Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences (KICS)

Keywords

  • Low-density parity-check code
  • Quantum key distribution
  • Security
  • Side-channel attack
  • Single trace attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Information Systems
  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Artificial Intelligence

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