Single trace side-channel attack on key reconciliation in quantum key distribution system and its efficient countermeasures

Dongjun Park; Gyu Sang Kim; Donghoe Heo; Suhri Kim; Hee Seok Kim; Seokhie Hong

doi:10.1016/j.icte.2021.01.013

Single trace side-channel attack on key reconciliation in quantum key distribution system and its efficient countermeasures

Dongjun Park
, Gyu Sang Kim
, Donghoe Heo
, Suhri Kim
, Hee Seok Kim^*
, Seokhie Hong

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

19 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Although quantum mechanics guarantees the security of the quantum key distribution system, it is crucial to examine whether the implementation flaws can lead to the disclosure of sensitive information. In this paper, we propose the side-channel attack on the key reconciliation in the quantum key distribution system. In this system, the sifted key and the syndrome are used to derive a shared secret key between two users. From our attack, these can be fully recovered through a single power consumption trace measured during the syndrome computation on the sender's side. Additionally, we propose efficient countermeasures to thwart such side-channel attacks.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	36-40
Number of pages	5
Journal	ICT Express
Volume	7
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.icte.2021.01.013
Publication status	Published - 2021 Mar

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This work was supported by the Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Science and ICT, South Korea under Grant NRF-2019R1A2C2088960 .

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 The Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences (KICS)

Keywords

Low-density parity-check code
Quantum key distribution
Security
Side-channel attack
Single trace attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Software
Information Systems
Hardware and Architecture
Computer Networks and Communications
Artificial Intelligence

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10.1016/j.icte.2021.01.013

Cite this

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abstract = "Although quantum mechanics guarantees the security of the quantum key distribution system, it is crucial to examine whether the implementation flaws can lead to the disclosure of sensitive information. In this paper, we propose the side-channel attack on the key reconciliation in the quantum key distribution system. In this system, the sifted key and the syndrome are used to derive a shared secret key between two users. From our attack, these can be fully recovered through a single power consumption trace measured during the syndrome computation on the sender's side. Additionally, we propose efficient countermeasures to thwart such side-channel attacks.",

keywords = "Low-density parity-check code, Quantum key distribution, Security, Side-channel attack, Single trace attack",

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AU - Kim, Hee Seok

AU - Hong, Seokhie

N1 - Funding Information: This work was supported by the Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Science and ICT, South Korea under Grant NRF-2019R1A2C2088960 . Publisher Copyright: © 2021 The Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences (KICS)

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N2 - Although quantum mechanics guarantees the security of the quantum key distribution system, it is crucial to examine whether the implementation flaws can lead to the disclosure of sensitive information. In this paper, we propose the side-channel attack on the key reconciliation in the quantum key distribution system. In this system, the sifted key and the syndrome are used to derive a shared secret key between two users. From our attack, these can be fully recovered through a single power consumption trace measured during the syndrome computation on the sender's side. Additionally, we propose efficient countermeasures to thwart such side-channel attacks.

AB - Although quantum mechanics guarantees the security of the quantum key distribution system, it is crucial to examine whether the implementation flaws can lead to the disclosure of sensitive information. In this paper, we propose the side-channel attack on the key reconciliation in the quantum key distribution system. In this system, the sifted key and the syndrome are used to derive a shared secret key between two users. From our attack, these can be fully recovered through a single power consumption trace measured during the syndrome computation on the sender's side. Additionally, we propose efficient countermeasures to thwart such side-channel attacks.

KW - Low-density parity-check code

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KW - Single trace attack

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Single trace side-channel attack on key reconciliation in quantum key distribution system and its efficient countermeasures

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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