Abstract
Side channel attacks exploit the physical properties of integrated circuits to extract sensitive information. They are becoming increasingly important in the context of the deployment of the Internet of Things. One of the most effective countermeasures consists of modifying the logic circuits to reduce the leakage through side channels. This paper presents a novel side channel attack tolerant balanced circuit (STBC) based on a dynamic and differential configuration. Its main feature is the use of an improved binary decision diagram (BDD) with a multi-output function and internal gate sharing to reduce the implementation area. Compared to the earlier proposed dual-rail pre-charge circuit with binary decision diagram (DP-BDD) technique, an area reduction of 13.7% is achieved. A fixed versus random t-test shows that STBC obtains a substantial reduction in information leakage even though small peak exists. Further, its input variable dependence is comparable with that of a normal CMOS circuit and similar with DP-BDD.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Proceedings - 2017 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI, ISVLSI 2017 |
| Editors | Ricardo Reis, Mircea Stan, Michael Huebner, Nikolaos Voros |
| Publisher | IEEE Computer Society |
| Pages | 74-79 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781509067626 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2017 Jul 20 |
| Event | 2017 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI, ISVLSI 2017 - Bochum, North Rhine-Westfalia, Germany Duration: 2017 Jul 3 → 2017 Jul 5 |
Publication series
| Name | Proceedings of IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI, ISVLSI |
|---|---|
| Volume | 2017-July |
| ISSN (Print) | 2159-3469 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 2159-3477 |
Other
| Other | 2017 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI, ISVLSI 2017 |
|---|---|
| Country/Territory | Germany |
| City | Bochum, North Rhine-Westfalia |
| Period | 17/7/3 → 17/7/5 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:This work was supported in part by the Research Council KU Leuven: C16/15/058. In addition, this work was supported by the Flemish Government, FWO G.00130.13N, FWO G.0876.14N and Thresholds G0842.13 and by the Hercules Foundation AKUL/11/19.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 IEEE.
Keywords
- BDD
- countermeasure
- side channel attack
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Hardware and Architecture
- Control and Systems Engineering
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering