Strategic alliances in a veto game: An experimental study

Chulyoung Kim; Sang Hyun Kim; Jinhyuk Lee; Joosung Lee

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102219

Strategic alliances in a veto game: An experimental study

Chulyoung Kim, Sang Hyun Kim, Jinhyuk Lee, Joosung Lee

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In a veto game, we investigate the effects of “buyout” which allows non-veto players strategically form an intermediate coalition. First, our experimental findings show that the proportion of intermediate coalition formation is much lower than predicted by theory, regardless of the relative negotiation power between veto and non-veto players. Second, allowing coalition formation among non-veto players does not affect the surplus distribution between veto and non-veto players, which diverges from core allocations. These findings contrast to the literature, which views the ability to form an intermediate coalition as a valuable asset for non-veto players in increasing their bargaining power.

Original language	English
Article number	102219
Journal	European Journal of Political Economy
Volume	75
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102219
Publication status	Published - 2022 Dec

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
We are grateful to the editor and two referees for their valuable comments that substantially improved our paper. We are also thankful to Syngjoo Choi, Subhasish Chowdhury, Daeyoung Jeong, Duk Gyoo Kim, Semin Kim, Jaeok Park, Euncheol Shin, and seminar participants at Yonsei University for valuable comments. All remaining errors are our own. This work was supported by the Yonsei University Future-leading Research Initiative of 2018 ( RMS2 2018-22-0088 ) and Korea University Grant ( K1720421 ).

Funding Information:
This work was supported by the Yonsei University Future-leading Research Initiative of 2018 ( RMS2 2018-22-0088 ) and Korea University Grant ( K172042 ).

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Elsevier B.V.

Keywords

Coalition bargaining
Experiment
Game theory
Intermediate coalition formation
Non-core allocation
Veto game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Political Science and International Relations

Access to Document

10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102219

Cite this

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title = "Strategic alliances in a veto game: An experimental study",

abstract = "In a veto game, we investigate the effects of “buyout” which allows non-veto players strategically form an intermediate coalition. First, our experimental findings show that the proportion of intermediate coalition formation is much lower than predicted by theory, regardless of the relative negotiation power between veto and non-veto players. Second, allowing coalition formation among non-veto players does not affect the surplus distribution between veto and non-veto players, which diverges from core allocations. These findings contrast to the literature, which views the ability to form an intermediate coalition as a valuable asset for non-veto players in increasing their bargaining power.",

keywords = "Coalition bargaining, Experiment, Game theory, Intermediate coalition formation, Non-core allocation, Veto game",

author = "Chulyoung Kim and Kim, {Sang Hyun} and Jinhyuk Lee and Joosung Lee",

note = "Funding Information: We are grateful to the editor and two referees for their valuable comments that substantially improved our paper. We are also thankful to Syngjoo Choi, Subhasish Chowdhury, Daeyoung Jeong, Duk Gyoo Kim, Semin Kim, Jaeok Park, Euncheol Shin, and seminar participants at Yonsei University for valuable comments. All remaining errors are our own. This work was supported by the Yonsei University Future-leading Research Initiative of 2018 ( RMS2 2018-22-0088 ) and Korea University Grant ( K1720421 ). Funding Information: This work was supported by the Yonsei University Future-leading Research Initiative of 2018 ( RMS2 2018-22-0088 ) and Korea University Grant ( K172042 ). Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2022 Elsevier B.V.",

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language = "English",

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N2 - In a veto game, we investigate the effects of “buyout” which allows non-veto players strategically form an intermediate coalition. First, our experimental findings show that the proportion of intermediate coalition formation is much lower than predicted by theory, regardless of the relative negotiation power between veto and non-veto players. Second, allowing coalition formation among non-veto players does not affect the surplus distribution between veto and non-veto players, which diverges from core allocations. These findings contrast to the literature, which views the ability to form an intermediate coalition as a valuable asset for non-veto players in increasing their bargaining power.

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Strategic alliances in a veto game: An experimental study

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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