TY - JOUR
T1 - Strategic alliances in a veto game
T2 - An experimental study
AU - Kim, Chulyoung
AU - Kim, Sang Hyun
AU - Lee, Jinhyuk
AU - Lee, Joosung
N1 - Funding Information:
We are grateful to the editor and two referees for their valuable comments that substantially improved our paper. We are also thankful to Syngjoo Choi, Subhasish Chowdhury, Daeyoung Jeong, Duk Gyoo Kim, Semin Kim, Jaeok Park, Euncheol Shin, and seminar participants at Yonsei University for valuable comments. All remaining errors are our own. This work was supported by the Yonsei University Future-leading Research Initiative of 2018 ( RMS2 2018-22-0088 ) and Korea University Grant ( K1720421 ).
Funding Information:
This work was supported by the Yonsei University Future-leading Research Initiative of 2018 ( RMS2 2018-22-0088 ) and Korea University Grant ( K172042 ).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2022/12
Y1 - 2022/12
N2 - In a veto game, we investigate the effects of “buyout” which allows non-veto players strategically form an intermediate coalition. First, our experimental findings show that the proportion of intermediate coalition formation is much lower than predicted by theory, regardless of the relative negotiation power between veto and non-veto players. Second, allowing coalition formation among non-veto players does not affect the surplus distribution between veto and non-veto players, which diverges from core allocations. These findings contrast to the literature, which views the ability to form an intermediate coalition as a valuable asset for non-veto players in increasing their bargaining power.
AB - In a veto game, we investigate the effects of “buyout” which allows non-veto players strategically form an intermediate coalition. First, our experimental findings show that the proportion of intermediate coalition formation is much lower than predicted by theory, regardless of the relative negotiation power between veto and non-veto players. Second, allowing coalition formation among non-veto players does not affect the surplus distribution between veto and non-veto players, which diverges from core allocations. These findings contrast to the literature, which views the ability to form an intermediate coalition as a valuable asset for non-veto players in increasing their bargaining power.
KW - Coalition bargaining
KW - Experiment
KW - Game theory
KW - Intermediate coalition formation
KW - Non-core allocation
KW - Veto game
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85130313799&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102219
DO - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102219
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85130313799
SN - 0176-2680
VL - 75
JO - European Journal of Political Economy
JF - European Journal of Political Economy
M1 - 102219
ER -