Abstract
Firms often announce new products well in advance of their actual market availability. The incentives for pre-announcements are conceived to be stronger in markets with network effects because they can be used to induce the delay of consumers purchases and forestall the build-up of rival products installed bases. However, such announcements often are not fulfilled, raising antitrust concerns. We analyze the effects of product pre-announcements in the presence of network effects when firms strategically make false announcements. We also discuss their implications for consumer welfare.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-20 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2019 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:＊ Jay Pil Choi acknowledges the financial support of Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2016S1A5A2A01022389), This research is supported by a Korea University grant (K1707611).
Publisher Copyright:
Hitotsubashi University
Keywords
- D8
- Network effects
- Product pre-announcements
- Reputation JEL Classification Codes: L1
- Technology adoption
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Business,Management and Accounting
- Economics and Econometrics
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