SysBumps: Exploiting Speculative Execution in System Calls for Breaking KASLR in macOS for Apple Silicon

Apple silicon is the proprietary ARM-based processor that powers the mainstream of Apple devices. The move to this proprietary architecture presents unique challenges in addressing security issues, requiring huge research efforts into the security of Apple silicon-based systems. In this paper, we study the security of KASLR, the randomization-based kernel hardening technique, on the state-of-the-art macOS system equipped with Apple silicon processors. Because KASLR has been subject to many microarchitectural side-channel attacks, the latest operating systems, including macOS, use kernel isolation, which separates the kernel page table from the userspace table. Kernel isolation in macOS provides a barrier to KASLR break attacks. To overcome this, we exploit speculative execution in system calls. By using Spectre-type gadgets in system calls, an unprivileged attacker can cause translations of the attacker’s chosen kernel addresses, causing the TLB to change according to the validity of the address. This allows the construction of an attack primitive that breaks KASLR bypassing kernel isolation. Since the TLB is used as a side-channel source, we reverse-engineer the hidden internals of the TLB on various M-series processors using a hardware performance monitoring unit. Based on our attack primitive, we implement SysBumps, the first KASLR break attack on macOS for Apple silicon. Throughout evaluation, we show that SysBumps can effectively break KASLR across different M-series processors and macOS versions. We also discuss possible mitigations against the proposed attack.