The gatekeeper's optimal fee structure when sellers can price discriminate

Jae Nahm

doi:10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00029-6

The gatekeeper's optimal fee structure when sellers can price discriminate

Jae Nahm

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This article investigates a monopoly gatekeeper's optimal fee structure under the premise that sellers can charge two prices: one price is for subscribers, and the other is for non-subscribers. The gatekeeper's optimal fee structure attains the social optimal allocation.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	9-14
Number of pages	6
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	80
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00029-6
Publication status	Published - 2003 Jul 1
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Advertising
Information gatekeeper
Price discrimination
Price search

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00029-6

Cite this

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KW - Price discrimination

KW - Price search

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The gatekeeper's optimal fee structure when sellers can price discriminate

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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