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The gatekeeper's optimal fee structure when sellers can price discriminate
Jae Nahm
Research output
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Contribution to journal
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Article
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peer-review
4
Citations (Scopus)
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Dive into the research topics of 'The gatekeeper's optimal fee structure when sellers can price discriminate'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
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Keyphrases
Fee Structure
100%
Gatekeepers
100%
Optimal Allocation
33%
Optimal Fee
100%
Seller
100%
Social Optimum
33%
Subscriber
66%
Social Sciences
Gatekeeper
100%
Monopolies
33%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Monopoly
100%