The incentive effect of coarsening the competition structure in a tournament

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    5 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    The incentive effect of coarsening the competition structure in a tournament is studied. By coarsening the competition structure, we mean that coarser performance measure is used while finer information is available. Examples include letter grades or grade classes when finer numeric grades are available. Coarsening the competition structure has two countervailing incentive effects. While it reduces the likelihood that marginal effort changes the result, the reward change will be bigger once the result is changed. We provide a sufficient condition on the performance distribution for the reduction of work incentive by coarsening; log-concavity of the density.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)411-414
    Number of pages4
    JournalEconomics Letters
    Volume125
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2014 Dec 1

    Bibliographical note

    Funding Information:
    The author acknowledges support from the Korean National Research Foundation ( 2014S1A5A8017336 ).

    Publisher Copyright:
    © 2014 Elsevier B.V.

    Copyright:
    Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

    Keywords

    • Coarsening
    • Incentive effect
    • Log-concave density
    • Tournament

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

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