Abstract
The incentive effect of coarsening the competition structure in a tournament is studied. By coarsening the competition structure, we mean that coarser performance measure is used while finer information is available. Examples include letter grades or grade classes when finer numeric grades are available. Coarsening the competition structure has two countervailing incentive effects. While it reduces the likelihood that marginal effort changes the result, the reward change will be bigger once the result is changed. We provide a sufficient condition on the performance distribution for the reduction of work incentive by coarsening; log-concavity of the density.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 411-414 |
Number of pages | 4 |
Journal | Economics Letters |
Volume | 125 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2014 Dec 1 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:The author acknowledges support from the Korean National Research Foundation ( 2014S1A5A8017336 ).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 Elsevier B.V.
Copyright:
Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
Keywords
- Coarsening
- Incentive effect
- Log-concave density
- Tournament
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics