The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism

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    11 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This paper introduces the participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, which satisfies both ex-ante budget balance and interim individual rationality. We bound the efficiency loss of this mechanism by a parameter that captures the structure of marginal contributions to the social welfare. We then apply the theory to quite general multiple unit double auction problems to show that the participatory VCG mechanism achieves asymptotic efficiency.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)324-336
    Number of pages13
    JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
    Volume44
    Issue number3-4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2008 Feb

    Keywords

    • Asymptotic efficiency
    • Double auction
    • Participation fees
    • Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Applied Mathematics

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