The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism

Kiho Yoon

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.05.009

The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism

Kiho Yoon

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper introduces the participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, which satisfies both ex-ante budget balance and interim individual rationality. We bound the efficiency loss of this mechanism by a parameter that captures the structure of marginal contributions to the social welfare. We then apply the theory to quite general multiple unit double auction problems to show that the participatory VCG mechanism achieves asymptotic efficiency.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	324-336
Number of pages	13
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	44
Issue number	3-4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.05.009
Publication status	Published - 2008 Feb

Keywords

Asymptotic efficiency
Double auction
Participation fees
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Applied Mathematics

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10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.05.009

Cite this

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The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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