Abstract
This paper introduces the participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, which satisfies both ex-ante budget balance and interim individual rationality. We bound the efficiency loss of this mechanism by a parameter that captures the structure of marginal contributions to the social welfare. We then apply the theory to quite general multiple unit double auction problems to show that the participatory VCG mechanism achieves asymptotic efficiency.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 324-336 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Journal of Mathematical Economics |
Volume | 44 |
Issue number | 3-4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2008 Feb |
Keywords
- Asymptotic efficiency
- Double auction
- Participation fees
- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Applied Mathematics