Wars of attrition with spending constraints

Sung Ha Hwang, Youngwoo Koh

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We study wars of attrition with spending constraints. Specifically, there are two players with different values of the prize and costs of continuing wars, and they are endowed with limited budgets that can be used during the war. Two players compete by choosing the time at which they intend to give up within the constraints. We find the constrained mixed strategy equilibrium for this model and provide a full characterization of equilibrium depending on whether each player's constraint is binding or nonbinding.

Original languageEnglish
JournalInternational Journal of Economic Theory
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2024

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 International Association for Economic Theory.

Keywords

  • asymmetric values
  • budget constraints
  • optimization
  • war of attrition

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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