Wars of attrition with spending constraints

Sung Ha Hwang; Youngwoo Koh

doi:10.1111/ijet.12397

Wars of attrition with spending constraints

Sung Ha Hwang
, Youngwoo Koh^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We study wars of attrition with spending constraints. Specifically, there are two players with different values of the prize and costs of continuing wars, and they are endowed with limited budgets that can be used during the war. Two players compete by choosing the time at which they intend to give up within the constraints. We find the constrained mixed strategy equilibrium for this model and provide a full characterization of equilibrium depending on whether each player's constraint is binding or nonbinding.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	227-242
Number of pages	16
Journal	International Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	20
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12397
Publication status	Published - 2024 Jun

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 International Association for Economic Theory.

Keywords

asymmetric values
budget constraints
optimization
war of attrition

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1111/ijet.12397

Cite this

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Wars of attrition with spending constraints

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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