Abstract
In this paper, we evaluate the security of lightweight block ciphers mCrypton and LED against biclique cryptanalysis. In cases of mCryton-64/96/128, our attacks require computational complexities of $2^{63.18}, 2^{94.81}$ and $2^{126.56}$, respectively. These results are the first known biclique cryptanalytic results on mCrypton. The attack on a 29-round reduced LED-64 needs $2^{63.58}$ 29-round reduced LED-64 encryptions. In the cases of LED-80/96/128, we propose the attacks on two versions. First, to recover the secret key of 45-round reduced LED-80/96/128, our attacks require computational complexities of $2^{79.45}, 2^{95.45}$ and $2^{127.45}$, respectively. To attack the full version, we require computational complexities of $2^{79.37}, 2^{95.37}$ and $2^{127.37}$, respectively. However, in these cases, we need the full codebook. These results are superior to known biclique cryptanalytic results on LED.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 716-732 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications |
| Volume | 8 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2015 Jul 20 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:This work was supported by a Korea University Grant for Kitae Jeong. Also this research was supported by the MKE(The Ministry of Knowledge Economy), Korea, under the ITRC(Information Technology Research Center) support program (NIPA-2013-H0301-13-3007) supervised by the NIPA(National IT Industry Promotion Agency).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2013, Springer Science+Business Media New York.
Keywords
- Biclique
- Block cipher
- Cryptanalysis
- LED
- mCrypton
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Software
- Computer Networks and Communications