Scholars and policymakers have long examined whether and to what extent public income transfer programs create work disincentives. Less explored are the patterns and mechanisms through which perceived work disincentives shape public attitudes toward such programs. The present article bridges this gap by examining how individuals' exposure to a moral hazard discourse affects their support for an income transfer program. Our original survey experiment in South Korea finds that the effect of an identically worded piece of moral hazard information plays out differently depending on the eligibility criteria of the program in question (means-tested vs. universal) and the economic status of the respondents. The findings have significant implications for understanding the support base for the welfare state in the context of resurging interest in basic/guaranteed income.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
This project was funded by research grants from the Political Economy and Transnational Governance (PETGOV) Program Group at the University of Amsterdam. The human subject protocol of the research was evaluated by the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR) Ethical Advisory Board. We thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments. Jaemin Shim provided helpful comments on an early draft of the article. Seiki Tanaka also acknowledges the support of the MacMillan Center of Yale University and the Center for Global Partnership (CGP) of the Japan Foundation.
© 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Public Administration